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A CRITICAL EVALUATION OF STATE FOREIGN
CORPORATION LAWS AS A BAR TO FEDERAL
DIVERSITY JURISDICTION
All fifty states have statutes requiring foreign corporations to register
as a condition to doing business in the state.1 These statutes generally
require designation of an agent to receive service of process, or alter-
natively allow process to be served on any officer of the corporation
found in the state or, if none can be found, on a state official.2 In all
but four states,3 the penalty for non-compliance is restricted access to
the state courts.' The provision of the Model Business Code reflects this
approach, and has been used as a prototype by many states: "No foreign
corporation transacting business in this State without a certificate of
authority shall be permitted to maintain any action, suit or proceeding
in any court of this State, until such corporation shall have obtained a
certificate of authority." 5
This note advocates that corporations are entitled to bring suit in
federal courts on the basis of the diversity jurisdiction granted by Con-
gress regardless of the apparent bar created by these state registration
statutes for foreign corporations. The history and rationale of these
laws and their present limited utility are discussed. The rationale of this
federal jurisdictional standard, in addition to the recent movement of
the Supreme Court in sanctioning the existence of a federal body of
non-statutory law, is outlined in support of this proposition. Finally, a
few collateral problems resulting from the application of foreign cor-
poration laws are pointed out.
THE HISTORY AND RATIONALE OF FOREIGN CORPORATION LAWS
Foreign corporation laws were adopted during the evolution of the
federal constitutional requirements of due process. Historically, the
1. See, e.g., Business Corporation Act, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, §§ 157.102, 157.109,
157.125 (Smith-Hurd 1949) (no power to sue); MicH. Comp. LAWS ANN. §§ 450.93,
450.95 (1945) (contracts void); N.Y. Bus. Cor. LAw § 1312 (McKinney 1963); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 11, §§ 691, 764 (1947) (contracts void); WAsH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 23A.32.010, 23A.32.190 (1967) (no power to sue).
2. See, e.g., VA. CODE, ANm. § 13.1-119 (Repl. Vol. 1964).
3. Delaware, Georgia, Kansas, and Kentucky.
4. 1 P-H CoP. $ 858 (1964).
5. ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT § 177 (1953) (transacting business without a
certificate of authority). See also id. § 99 (admission of a foreign corporation).
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requirerrient that original legal process be served within the terri-
torial boundaries of the state was based on the coercive powers of the
state over those within its boundaries. This concept had originated in
the 1500's with Ulrich Huber's writings. Fuber wrote, "The laws
of each state have force within the limits of that government and bind
all subject to it, but not beyond." " Story imported this idea to America
in his commentaries on the Conflict of Laws.7 By 1800, the delivery of
original process within the state's boundaries was accepted as prerequi-
site to the assumption of general jurisdiction by the state, or extension
of full faith and credit between states,8 and was made part of the con-
stitutional requirement of due process in the decision of Pennoyer v.
Neff.2
Jurisdictional limitations regarding corporations were rendered inef-
fective by early decisions denying corporations legal existence outside
the states which had created them. And once it was settled that a state
could exclude foreign corporations completely, it was easy to justify
conditional entry.' This in turn provided the logical basis for foreign
corporation laws and their restrictions on a corporation's entry into the
state.
As time passed, however, writers began to challenge Huber's theory
of the territorial limits of laws and suggest that his maxim be discarded,
especially in the face of the modern realities surrounding transportation
and communication. 1 It was also recognized that although the law of
a given state may be enforced only within its boundaries, it still may
affect legal relations outside of them.' 2 These changes in legal philosophy
necessarily affected the rule of Pennoyer v. Neff' 3 which was criticized
as an oversimplified fusion of two issues: whether there is a sufficient
relationship between the defendant and the forum to allow adjudica-
tion of the claim against him, and whether the defendant has received
sufficient notice.'4 The Supreme Court explained the notice requirement
6. Walker, Foreign Corporation Laws: The Loss of Reason, 47 N. C. L. REv. 1, 2
(1968).
7. Id. at 3.
8. Id. at 5.
9. 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
10. Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1868); Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S.
(13 Pet.) 519 (1839).
11. See generally Walker, supra note 6, at 4.
12. Id.
13. 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
14. Walker, supra note 6, at 24.
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further in MacDonald v. Mabee' by holding that substituted service
may be wholly adequate to meet the requirements of due process if it
is reasonably likely to reach the defendant. Pennoyer v. Neff was, in
effect, superseded in the lntemnational Shoe case,' when the Court stated
that certain minimum contacts create a relationship with the forum to
such an extent that requiring the corporation to defend ".... does not
offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." 17 These
cases validated the use of long arm statutes, which to date have been
enacted in forty-four states.' In those states, if the "minimum contacts"
are present, service of process can be made on non-residents outside the
state in various ways with no need for local agents. In addition, the
widespread passage of state laws restricting the defense of ultra vires,
which heretofore could vitiate corporate liability if it were shown that
the corporation lacked legal capacity to act, removed any other osten-
sible base of support for foreign corporation laws. Thus, it is apparent
that the foreign corporations laws have been rendered obsolete with the
initial reasons behind their passage no longer applicable.
A FEDERAL JURISDICTIONAL STANDARD FOR CORPORATIONS
The basic constitutional right of a non-resident litigant to an inde-
pendent federal forum dates from the origins of the Constitution itself.19
There was a general belief which still persists, that a non-resident would
be subject to discrimination in state courts. State courts and judges had
been considered by some inferior to their federal counterparts in the
quality of justice dispensed.20 Such belief may not have been altogether
unjustified, since state judges are often subjected to strong local political
pressure. "Federal procedures are relatively enlightened; and the life
tenure, independence, respectable salary and prestige of the federal
bench have attracted . . . judges of relatively high caliber." 21 More-
over, there is often no specific requirement of legal training or experience
prerequisite to state judgeships, much less the scholarly erudition not
15. 243 U.S. 90 (1917).
16. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
17. Id. at 316.
18. The following states apparently have no statutory long-arm provision: Arizona,
Colorado, Delaware, North Dakota, Ohio and Wyoming.
19. U.S. CoNsr. art. III, § 2.
20. AMERiCAN LAw INSTITUTE, STUDY OF THE DIVIsION OF JURISDICrION BETWEEN
STATE & FEDERAL COURTS 99-104 (1969).
21. Currie, The Federal Courts and the American Law Institute, 36 U. Cm. L. REv.
1, 3 (1968).
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uncommon among federal judges..2' For these reasons, it is a maxim of
our legal system that a non-resident is entitled to an independent federal
system in which to adjudicate his rights within the framework of state
law.
In two recent cases, a debate occurred about the existence of a fed-
eral jurisdictional standard in diversity cases. Judge Clark argued in
]aftex23 that Rule Four of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, dealing
with service of process, sheds light on amenability to service. He argues
that the federal jurisdictional standard was historically created by
statute2 4 which treated service of process and venue as a unit. When
revised, in the interests of clarity and logic, the service of process rules
were separated from the venue provisions, but this does not negate
the existence of the federal standard. Judge Friendly's view, that al-
though Congress has the constitutional power to create a federal juris-
dictional standard, it has not yet done so, prevailed in Arrowsmith v.
United Press InternationaP6 and is the accepted view today. However,
the logic of Judge Friendly's argument fails when applied to a corpora-
tion, a fictitious legal entity. Any jurisdictional right to sue possessed
by a corporation must be specifically granted, for there is no such inher-
ent corporate right.
This proposition is apparent when examining the debate over the
proposed rules for restructuring jurisdiction in the federal courts for-
mulated by the American Law Institute. Clarity is the criterion used;
the ends sought include the avoidance of extensive preliminary litigation
and the reduction of friction between the state and federal courts.28
Present federal statutes provide that a corporation is a citizen of both
the state of incorporation and the state where it has its principal place
of business.29 Proposed section 1302 further limits utilization of diver-
sity jurisdiction by a corporation, by providing that an enterprise may
not invoke diversity jurisdiction in a state where it has maintained a
business establishment for two years. Clearly Congress could completely
22. For a comprehensive discussion of this topic, see Friendly, The Historic Basis
of Diversity Jurisdiction, 41 HARv. L. REv. 483 (1928).
23. Jaftex Corp. v. Randolph Mills, Inc., 282 F.2d 508 (2d Cir. 1960).
24. Judicature Act § 11, 1 Star. 78 (1789).
25. 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (1964) (venue); FED. R. Civ. P. 4(f) (service of process).
26. 320 F.2d 219 (2d Cir. 1963).
27. AM EScAN LAW INsrrtrur, supra note 20, §§ 1302, 1304.
28. Wright, Restructuring Federal Jurisdiction: The American Law Institute Pro-
posals, 26 WASH. & LEE L. Rv. 185, 187 (1969).
29. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c) (1964).
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abolish diversity jurisdiction in the case of corporations, as has been
suggested. This power and the statutes' use of the terms "invoke diver-
sity jurisdiction" create an inference of a federal jurisdictional standard
separate from that created by the incorporating state. If a corporation
can sue in a diversity case in a federal court, it has a power created by
federal law, not arising from any inherent nature of a corporation. 0
There are persuasive considerations why Congress should have in-
tended to make such a positive grant of jurisdiction to corporations.
Without access to federal courts, corporations might be apprehensive
about the uncertainties of the courts of a foreign state. By removing
this apprehension, commerce is fostered. Moreover, corporate officers
are aware of the universal opinion that the procedures available in the
federal courts are superior to those of the state courts. The federal courts
are the ideal forum for the construction of the uniform statutes regulat-
ing commercial law, as well as for uniform development of conflict of
laws rules. Such uniformity and procedural advantages would have the
obvious result of fostering commerce throughout the country, thus
embodying a historic federal interest and justifying a specific grant of
federal jurisdiction to corporations in diversity cases.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ERIE DOCTRINE AND THE STATUS OF
Woods v. Interstate Realty Co. TODAY
Recent modifications of the Erie doctrine indicate that the Supreme
Court is creating a body federal common law consistent with the fed-
eral jurisdictional standard herein advocated. These developments repre-
sent a return to ideas held in the early years of our country, when the
proposition that a "higher" or "natural" law existed was an accepted
philosophy. The Rules of Decision Act of 1789 was interpreted in light
of this philosophy in Swift v. Tyson." The act required application of
state law by federal courts in diversity cases. The Court held that "state
law" meant positive local statutes, not decisions of the states' highest
courts, which were construed as merely evidence of law. The result was
that federal courts were given power to overrule state courts on matters
of policy.32 A non-resident could, therefore, choose the court whose
law was the most favorable to his cause, making forum-shopping a tool
30. Moore & Weckstein, Corporations and Diversity of Citizenship jurisdiction: A
Supreme Court Fiction Revisited, 77 HARV. L. Rv. 1426, 1447 (1964).
31. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
32. Note, The Operation of Federalism in Diversity: Erie's Constitutional Basis,
40 IND. L.J. 512, 514-16 (1965).
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in the lawyer's bag of tricks. Acceptance of the idea of a higher com-
mon law by federal courts was perhaps understandable at the time in
light of the primitive condition of many state courts, the dearth of writ-
ten reports, and the fact that American legal thinking was a direct out-
growth of its English counterpart. As state governments became more
respected and communications improved, the abuses arising from the
doctrine of Swift v. Tyson became increasingly intolerable.33
The Erie case held that the law to be applied except in matters gov-
erned by the Constitution or acts of Congress was the states' statutory
and decisional law. 4 It was treated as axiomatic that there was no fed-
eral common law and that, absent an express grant of federal authority,
any infringement on the substantive rights of a citizen was an unconsti-
tutional violation of the states' authority as reserved by the Tenth
Amendment. 5 In diversity cases, the federal court came to be regarded
as simply another court of the state providing uniformity of treatment
for the litigants. Uniformity of treatment in turn abrogated the reasons
for forum shopping and thereby eliminated it.
The first of the Erie progeny of cases struggling to distinguish sub-
stantive from procedural law was Guaranty Trust Co. v. York,36 which
required the federal court to apply state law when the application of
federal law would "significantly affect the result of litigation." 37 This
became known as the outcome-determinative test. Guaranty Trust has
been criticized as being too mechanical. For under Erie, when examin-
ing the substance-procedure distinction, the courts had looked at the
state law as the embodiment of state policy. However, Guaranty Trust
begged the issue by ignoring policy in favor of result. The real ques-
tion in Guaranty Trust should have been directed at the meaning of
"substantive" in terms of valid state interest.3 s "It is not a proper as-
sumption that state interest is inexorably manifested by the result of a
given lawsuit.... [P] olicy is found in the source of law rather than the
outcome of a particular litigation." -9
This area involves the most sensitive problems of federalism and must
33. Black & White Taxicab Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab Co., 276 U.S. 518, 532
(1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
34. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
35. Note, Seaboard Finance Co. v. Davis, a New Approach to the Application of Erie,
2 JOHN MARSHALL J. PRAC. & PROC. 189, 191 (1968).
36. 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
37. Id. at 109.
38. Note, The Operation of Federalism in Diversity, supra note 32, at 528.
39. Id. at 528-29.
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be met in a flexible manner by recognizing conflicts in policy. Professor
Hart stated:
Thus far the Supreme Court's decisions on these matters seem
to be founded on no higher principle than that of eliminating every
possible reason for a litigant to prefer a federal to a state court.
The principle having no readily apparent stopping place, the reach
of the decision is unclear. What is more important is the triviality
of the principle. The more faithfully it is carried out the more
completely the constitutional and statutory grants of diversity
jurisdiction are emptied of intelligible meaning. The principle
passes over the essential rationale of the Erie opinion-the need of
recognizing the state courts as organs of coordinate authority with
other branches of the state government in the discharge of the
constitutional functions of the state-and most of the battery of
considerations marshalled by Brandeis as reasons for respecting
the constitutional plan.40
Apparently persuaded by these arguments, the Supreme Court began
whittling exceptions out of the Guaranty outcome determinative test.
Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop.41 created an exception to the
outcome-determinative test when there was an overriding federal con-
sideration. In the Byrd case the Seventh Amendment right to a jury
trial was involved.
The federal system is an independent system for administering
justice to litigants who properly invoke its jurisdiction .... The
policy of uniform enforcement of state created rights and obli-
gations . . . cannot in every case enact compliance with a state
rule... which disrupts the federal system of allocating functions
between judge and jury.42
Byrd suggests that even if the state rule reflects substantive rights, a
strong countervailing federal policy might prevail. The courts must
balance the federal policy against that of the state.
In 1965, the Supreme Court again was asked to apply the Byrd test.
40. Hart, The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 COLUM. L. REv. 489, 512
(1954).
41. 356 U.S. 525 (1958).
42. Id. at 537-38.
43. Note, Corporate Amenability to Process in the Federal Courts: State or Federal
jurisdictional Standards, 48 Mimi. L. REv. 1131, 1145 (1964).
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The question was: When federal procedural rules affect substantive
state rights, should the federal interest to be furthered by application of
federal procedural rules outweigh the state interest in having its sub-
stantive policy carried out? The Court in Hanna v. Pluren&4 avoided
the issue by refusing to test the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure by the
Erie doctrine. Instead, it held that the Rules Enabling Act of 1934 gave
Congress the power to make rules with the sole exception being that the
rules so promulgated 'shall neither abridge, enlarge, nor modify the sub-
stantive rights of any litigant." The Federal Rules which were within
the uncertain area between substance and procedure, and rationally capa-
ble of classification either way, should be applied in diversity cases. A
rule's tendency to promote forum shopping, the evil thought to be viti-
ated by Erie, was irrelevant.
Justice Harlan's concurring opinion in Hanna suggested that the
proper inquiry was whether the statute, although nominally procedural,
conflicts with the state's substantive regulation of the primary conduct
and activity of its citizens. Justice Harlan's reference to primary, private
activity has been taken up by the commentators as the proper criteria
by which to apply the Erie doctrine. It has been suggested that a sub-
stantive rule is one that influences the primary behavior of a citizen in
his everyday life, while a procedural rule affects only judicial house-
keeping regulating the fair disposition of cases in court. 6
Professor Stason has attacked the Byrd and Hanna decisions as pro-
moting "alteration of the intended nature of the federal union." 4 His
criticism includes the statement that "the Tenth Amendment implicitly
denies any force to federal policy as a standard by which to determine
whether rights created under powers reserved to the states in that
amendment may properly be infringed .... Federal policy considera-
tions are constitutionally irrelevant." 4 However, mitigating against this
view are recent civil rights decisions where Southern school segregation
policies have yielded to policy considerations rooted in the Constitution
itself. As Professor Anderson said, "A major established national policy
44. 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
45. Note, Seaboard Finance Co., supra note 35, at 200; Note, Erie, Forum Non Con-
veniens and Choice of Law in Diversity Cases, 53 VA. L. REv. 380, 393-94 (1967); Note,
Choice of Procedure in Diversity Cases, 75 YAmE L.J. 477, 482-85 (1966).
46. Stason, Choice of Law Within the Federal System: Erie versus Hanna, 52 CoRNEL.
L.Q. 377, 382 (1967). Professor Stason's article contains a spirited defense of
Guaranty Trust Co. v. York as well as a compelling argument that Hanna v. Plumer
violates the spirit of the Tenth Amendment by infringing on the states' reserved powers.
47. Id. at 393-94.
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of social morality cannot exist side-by-side with a conflicting state prac-
tice." 4 18 In discussing this problem of federalism, it is well not to over-
look the fact that when a federal and state rule conflict, the reason may
be failure by the state legislature to keep up with modern legal thinking.
The conflict results not from substantive policy, but rather from legis-
lative inaction.49
The issues of federalism can never be divorced from the basic axioms
underlying our judicial system. American jurisprudence was origi-
nally premised upon the existence of a higher law. As legal thinking
evolved, this idea was repudiated and Guaranty Trust marked the zenith
of reverence for states' rights. Since then, the pendulum seems to be
returning to a concept of a federal body of law. Legal thinking favors
federal forums where commerce, conflicts of laws, and international law
are concerned. Moreover, the victory for the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure in Hanna underlined the Supreme Court's desire to give the
federal courts maximum independence from state influence even in
diversity cases. As discussed previously, the Erie case and its progeny
are based on a repudiation of the existence of a federal body of common
law, which amounted to an acceptance of a philosophy by the legal
authorities of the time analogous to a moral judgment on the status of
the law. However, today there are areas such as commercial law and
conflicts of law in which the federal interest in development of uni-
formity is gaining acceptance which overrides any justification for
applying state law.50 This trend is based on a moral balancing of the
best interests of the country in light of social and economic conditions.
If there is a federal common law, then the Erie doctrine no longer has
any basis. Such a return of the ghost of Swift v. Tyson would probably
be favorably received by corporations.
As was said in response to the attempt of Guaranty Trust to create
an objective test, "The justice who wants to tell the world how he
decides cases . . . must say: 'This is what I believe is important in our
civilization and I shall do all I can to preserve it.... If this is too shock-
ing ... then society must take away the Court's power. There is no
48. Anderson, The Line Between Federal and State Court Jurisdiction, 63 MICH. L.
REv. 1203, 1209 (1965).
49. Note, A.LJ. Proposals to Expand Federal Diversity jurisdiction: Solution to
Multiparty, Multistate Controversies?, 48 MINN. L. REv. 1109, 1125 (1964).
50. See Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943); American Pipe &
Steel Corp. v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 292 F.2d 640 (9th Cir. 1961).
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middle ground.' "i' Judge Clark also commented that "it is an attempt
to avoid the unavoidable ... to ask judges not to judge, not to exercise
their judicial capacity or the power of their minds, even though Con-
gress and the Constitution have given them jurisdiction over the case." r2
A liberal eye should be kept on these trends, for the relationships of
federalism will be judged by the ethical predilections of our civilization,
rather than by a rigid application of rules which have lost their philo-
sophical basis. Law should reflect society's values, rather than society
be a slave to law. It must also be remembered that all so-called pro-
cedural rules upon examination will reveal some substantive essence at
their core. The judicial process was designed to ascertain the truth and
to work justice; the rules of the game insofar as they help accomplish
these ends are part of the individual's substantive rights. If carried to
it's logical conclusion, this proposition would result in all diversity cases
applying state procedures. However, in Hanna, the Supreme Court
underlined the distinction between substance and procedure, recognizing
that only by retaining the applicability of the Federal Rules will the
federal judiciary retain its independence and its concomitant function
in diversity cases.
The sum of Erie and its progeny is that when state and federal rules
conflict, and application of the federal rule would affect a variance in
the outcome, the court will apply the state rule unless there is a counter-
vailing federal consideration, except that the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure will always be applied in diversity cases. It may well occur
that the Erie doctrine will continue to be limited as the federal govern-
ment becomes the only instrumentality capable of handling many of
our problems.
In Woods v. Interstate Realty Co.,-3 the Supreme Court held that the
Mississippi statute that closed the door of the state courts to nonqualify-
ing foreign corporate plaintiffs applies also to the federal courts of the
state. The Court relied heavily on Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, which
required a federal court in a diversity case to apply state law if applica-
tion of a conflicting federal rule would "significantly affect the result
of litigation." 55 Since the Mississippi door-closing statute was obviously
51. Braden, The Searcb for Objectihty in Constitutional Law, 57 YALE L.J. 571, 594
(1948).
52. Clark, Federal Procedural Reform and States' Rights: To a More Perfect Union,
40 TEYAs L. REv. 211, 224 (1961).
53. 337 U.S. 535 (1949).
54. 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
55. Id. at 109.
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outcome-determinative, it must govern the case even in the federal
courts. The substantive policy that was embodied by the Mississippi
statute was never stated." In evaluating the Woods case, it appears that
subsequent decisions eroding the significance of the outcome-determina-
tive test, have also limited the force of the decision, and state door-closing
statutes will no longer be automatically honored by federal courts.
Under Byrd v. Blue Ridge Elec. Co-op,57 a federal court could assume
jurisdiction if the federal interest outweighed the substantive policy of
the state. Since long-arm statutes have made the foreign corporation
laws useless, it is impossible to find any substantive state policy. Clearly,
a federal court can take jurisdiction if there is no substantive policy
behind the denial of jurisdiction."s The fact that the state court is closed
is a reflection of prejudice against the foreign corporation, and ameliora-
tion of such local prejudice is the basic purpose of diversity jurisdiction.
As was stated by the Supreme Court itself, "There is sound historical
reason for believing that one of the purposes of the diversity clause was
to afford a federal court remedy when, for at least some reasons of state
policy, none would be available in state courts." 59
Prior to the Woods case, there was a line of cases dealing with foreign
corporation laws which were considered by the Court to be "obsolete
insofar as they are based on a view of diversity jurisdiction which came
to an end with Erie Railroad v. Tompkins... ." 'o This is an enigmatic
statement indeed, shedding no light on the reason why the Court sud-
denly decided to deviate from these cases. Up until Woods, the cases
turned on the two different types of foreign corporation law. Where
the law made local contracts of non-complying foreign corporations
void, the statute was honored by the federal courts,"' but only in en-
forcement of the contracts, never as a bar to diversity jurisdiction.
Where the laws closed local courts to the non-complying foreign cor-
poration, the federal courts refused to allow a state statute to control
access to federal courts.e Moreover, the Erie decision overruled Swift
v. TysonG3 specifically insofar as it allowed the federal courts to ignore
56. See Note, Corporate Amenability to Process, supra note 43, at 1137; Note, Erie,
supra note 45, at 391.
57. 356 U.S. 525 (1958).
58. Note, Corporate Amenability to Process, supra note 43, at 1146.
59. Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 558 (1949).
60. Woods v. Interstate Realty Co., 337 U.S. 535, 537 (1949).
61. Diamond Glue Co. v. United States Glue Co., 187 U.S. 611 (1903).
62. David Lupton's Sons v. Automobile Club of Am., 225 U.S. 489 (1912).
63. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
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the "unwritten law of the State as declared by its highest court" '4 but
did not affect federal treatment of state statutes. Professor Walker, in
a masterful analysis, argues that the prior treatment of foreign corpora-
tion law was perfectly consistent with Erie, as well as with the outcome-
determinative test of Guaranty Trust and should never have been con-
sidered overruledYat If Woods were decided today, in the light of the
development of the Erie doctrine, the Mississippi foreign corporation
law would not have bound the federal court which would have applied
the pre-Erie law on the point. As the federal courts increasingly ignore
these laws, Woods, which cast an unwarranted light of legitimacy on
door closing statutes, should be overturned, along with the statutes
themselves. If not outright victims of repeal, the statutes will molder
on the books, historical relics of interest only as illustrations of a search
for supremacy of states' rights, in a time and place where the function
of the states is merely to serve the interest of society.
OTHER PROBLEMS ARISING FROM FOREIGN CORPORATION LAWS
Application of foreign corporation laws has resulted in annoying
inconsistencies, as well as the imposition of unwise and impractical
burdens on interstate commerce. 6 While some cases have resulted in
windfalls for local defendants, 67 a different example of the problem
involved dissatisfied shareholders of a Pennsylvania corporation who
organized an Illinois corporation under the same name. They expected
to carry on business protected from an unfair competition suit because
the Pennsylvania corporation could not sue in Illinois until it qualified,
and could not qualify because of the conflict in names. The court re-
fused to tolerate this fraud and the scheme failed.3
At least one court has refused to follow Woods, because it disagreed
with it.'19 Courts generally won't follow the Woods ruling where the
suit involves an interstate transaction.70 Other courts have avoided the
64. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64,71 (1938).
65. Walker, Foreign Corporation Laws: Re-examining Woods v. Interstate Realty Co.
and Reopening the Federal Courts, 48 N. C. L. Rv. 56, 59-67 (1969).
66. Id. at 67-69.
67. Hicks Body Co. v. Ward Body Works, Inc., 233 F.2d 481 (8th Cir. 1956);
Paisley Products, Inc. v. Trojan Luggage Co., 293 F. Supp. 397 (W.D. Tenn. 1968).
68. Hulburt Oil & Grease Co. v. Hulburt Oil & Grease Co., 371 F.2d 251 (7th Cir.
1966).
69. Emulsol Corp. v. Rubenstein & Son Produce, Inc., 111 F. Supp. 410 (N.D. Tex.
1953).
70. Waggener Paint Co. v. Paint Distributors, Inc., 228 F.2d 111 (5th Cir. 1955).
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Woods result by stating that there was not an adequate showing that
the nonregistered foreign corporation was doing business in the state.71
Foreign corporation laws have also encouraged inappropriate expansions
of jurisdiction to cases where the only contact the forum had with the
case was that one of the parties had qualified to do business there. 2
It has been convincingly argued that foreign corporation laws are an
unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce. 73 The Supreme Court
has mechanically applied a distinction between interstate and intrastate,
allowing a state to validly regulate the latter,74 ignoring the Commerce
Clause. A more rational test would be to weigh the extent of the burden
on interstate commerce against the state's interest in the regulation."
The decision which upheld the Minnesota foreign corporation statute as
not constituting an undue burden on interstate commerce 6 has been
criticized for its failure to look to any valid state policy underlying the
law.77 The only apparent justification for the law is that it made it
unnecessary for the resident plaintiff to prove "minimum contacts" as
a basis for service of process on the non-resident corporate defendant.
In the face of the limited utility of foreign corporation laws stands
the considerable financial burden placed upon the economy of the nation
by them. Professor Walker outlines the vast array of technicalities
required for registration and qualification and the vast expense involved
in fulfilling them.7' An industry of service corporations has developed
specifically to register corporations in compliance with the local laws.
These companies do such things as fill out forms, maintain local agents,
file annual reports, file charter amendments, and so on. The fees paid
to these companies and to the states add up to a vast tax on doing inter-
state business, which is totally regressive, costing the small corporation
the same fee as the large one. By eliminating the useless restrictions
on trade contained in foreign corporation laws, the national economy
will run more efficiently and contribute more to the national well-being.
WENDY W. DAVIS
71. E.g., Rock-Ola Manufacturing Corp. v. Wirtz, 249 F.2d 813 (4th Cir. 1957).
72. Walker, Foreign Corporation Laws: A Current Account, 47 N. C. L. Rv. 733,
734-38 (1969).
73. Id. at 750-56.
74. Eli Lilly Co. v. Say-On-Drugs, Inc., 366 U.S. 276 (1961).
75. Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945).
76. Union Brokerage Co. v. Jensen, 322 U.S. 202 (1944).
77. Note, Foreign Corporations: The Interrelation of Jurisdiction and Qualification,
33 IND. L.J. 358, 367 (1958).
78. Walker, supra note 72, at 757-59.
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